This paper reviews annual government spending on Canadian agriculture that attempts to stabilize and 25 enhance farm incomes. Over the past five years two thirds of the $3 billion spent on agriculture goes 26 into stabilization programs to support farm incomes. However, this level of support raises questions 27 about the environmental consequences of enhanced agricultural production. Environmental impacts 28 from agriculture are well known and addressed in US and EU policies. In contrast, Canadian government 29 expenditures on environmental initiatives in agriculture, as a share of farm income, are more than 10 30 times smaller than those in the US and the EU. Nonetheless the evidence is that Canadian programs 31 have modest impacts on production but that chemical and fertilizer input use may be higher than in the 32 absence of the program. One possible course of action is to introduce cross-compliance between 33 D r a f t Significant changes in developed country agricultural policy have taken place over the past 20 years, 40 spurred by budgetary concerns and the desire to limit production incentives and minimize distortions to 41 trade. Commodity price supports were commonly used in the past. However, these measures frequently 42 increased production, putting downward pressure on world prices. The unintended consequence was 43 that producers in other countries faced lower prices and reduced market access. More recent reforms in 44 the United States and the European Union have shifted farm support to direct payments which 45 presumably have fewer production incentives. The Canadian approach has been to provide whole-farm 46 support programs which prompt minimal production incentives. Canadian programs aim to offer 47 protection from "severe market volatility and disasters" (AAFC 2014) , and are described as business risk 48 management (BRM). The current suite of BRM programs includes AgriInvest (a subsidized savings 49 account), AgriStability (a deficiency payment triggered by a margin based measure of overall farm 50 income), AgriInsurance (production/crop insurance) and AgriRecovery (a safety net program for disaster 51 assistance) all of which pay out when current income is lower than a predefined threshold. 52
In 2013, US$258 billion (18% of total farm receipts) was transferred from developed country 53 government treasuries to agriculture (OECD 2012). In the mid-1980s, government support was nearly 54 twice as high (37% of farm receipts), and agricultural economists determined that total government 55 payments exceeded the benefits to consumers and producers (Alston and Hurd 1990; Chang et al. 1992) . 56 D r a f t 4 the size of Canadian business risk management programs. In addition an audit of the early cost-share 64 environmental program suggested that it was ineffective in terms of participation at the farm level and 65 that its environmental effectiveness would be extremely difficult to evaluate (Auditor General of Canada 66 2008) . Nonetheless, there is popular support for increased environmental programming and explicit 67 calls for efforts that link agriculture support payments to environmental objectives (Seguin 2012) . Given 68 that agricultural support programs have been reformed in the direction of becoming more "production 69 neutral" but there remain ongoing concerns with environmental externalities, the motivation for this 70 study is explore the spillovers from Canadian agricultural support policies to issues of environmental 71
management. 72
The objective of this study is to examine the rationale for government support for domestic agriculture 73 and to explore the unintended consequences of this support -especially the negative environmental 74 The Canadian government has for many years provided safety net programs to support and stabilize 88 farm income, with the aim to reduce the negative impacts of production disasters and volatile 89 commodity prices (Figure 1 ). Detailed historical summaries of these programs are provided by Schmitz 90 (2008) 
Program Objectives

130
The rationale for government support of agriculture in Canada and other countries has generally 131 centered around three main themes. First, there is a common belief that low levels of income for farms 132 and farm families are less than socially desirable. Second, proponents assert that farms are exposed to 133 abnormal levels of risk beyond the proprietor's control. Finally, there is the belief among some that 134 supporting agriculture also fosters rural development, the latter of which has long been a public policy 135 goal (Blake 2003) . 136
Skogstad (2011) describes a multiplicity of policy objectives that have been historically provided for 137 government intervention in Canadian agriculture. However, a striking feature of this review is the 138 limited number of policy instruments available to achieve these objectives. Tinbergen (1952) advocated 139 a rule that the number of policy instruments has to equal the number of objectives. Attempting to 140 address multiple objectives with a single instrument risks not only the ability to determine if the policy 141 instrument has been successful but also may lead to interest groups continually asking for new 142 programs to replace the existing policies. This is evident in the succession of safety net programs 143 presented in Figure 1 . The problem is that it has never been defined whether BRM programs aim to 144 7 Under supply management, considerable transfers from consumers to producers occur, likely with associated environmental externalities. However, since this is not a BRM program, these effects are outside the scope of this paper. experienced a 14% decline in net farm operating income and a corresponding 34% increase in off-farm 158 employment income (Statistics Canada 2012b). These farms are large enough to require almost full-time 159 farm labour, but not large enough to achieve economies of scale; therefore they have limited 160 opportunities to reduce costs and consequently do not provide enough returns to labour. For those 161 farms where the operator has skills that are specific to farming, there are also limited opportunities to 162 pursue higher paying off-farm employment. 163
However, there are problems with using net farm income as a measure of producer welfare. Measures 164 of farm profitability can be manipulated by changing the reporting of depreciation and inventory 165 adjustments. Farm returns can be re-invested into agriculture and net farm income can be reduced by 166 D r a f t 9 paying wages to family members -neither of which has a true negative impact on the farm household. 167
Net income cannot be used as the sole determinant of farm financial health. ROAs are comparable to other sectors within the economy. It should also be noted that as returns are 174 re-invested into agriculture this increases expenses (land value and input prices) and puts further 175 pressure on farm financial performance, which can increase government payments. This significant 176 increase in total wealth raises the issue of why government programs continue to provide large financial 177 support to agriculture. 178
However, diversity in farm size, demographics, and household income can increase the difficulty in 179 measuring the true profitability of the agricultural sector. Therefore, while there may be certain types of 180 agriculture or segments of the farm population for which public support of farm income is justified, 181 identification of these situations and appropriate targeting may prove to be challenging. 182
Reducing Risk in Agriculture 183
Two factors contribute significant risk to farm income: production uncertainty (related to weather, 184 pests, etc.) and price uncertainty. Government action is seen as necessary if no contingency markets 185 exist to share the risk and the resulting level of risk is beyond that felt in other sectors. There is some 186 evidence that Canadian farm prices are more variable than the industrial product price index, with an 187 average monthly change of 1.4% and 0.5%, respectively, over the period of 1952 to 2011 (Figure 2) . 188 8 The annual Farm Financial Survey draws from a sample from all farms with >$10,000 in gross annual income. Canada have increasing numbers of non-farm households, and the majority of payments from current 207 farm programs tend to go to a relatively small number of households with the highest farm income. established criteria for domestic support programs that would not be subject to reduction 267 commitments. AIDA and CFIP followed paragraph 7 of Annex 2 and were not subject to reduction 268 commitments. NISA, CAIS, and AgriStability did not meet the criteria of paragraph 7, but because the 269 expenditure on these programs was less than Canada's WTO commitment, the programs were not 270 effectively disciplined by the Agreement on Agriculture. However, outside observers have questioned 271 whether these policies are efficient and achieve their stated goals. OECD economists recently analyzed 272
D
Canadian agricultural policy and concluded that the large number of risk management options lead to 273 crowding out of private risk management and a lack of real incentives for farmers to take much 274 11 The Uruguay Round WTO Agreement on Agriculture established reduction commitments to reduce domestic support. Each member's current expenditures are to be compared with average support payments between 1986-88, notified to the WTO, and subsequently reduced if they exceed 20% of this average support. The structure of government support in Europe, the US, and Canada has moved away from commodity-321 specific payments to less distortionary approaches. Coupled commodity-specific programs have been 322 reduced and to a limited extent risk management programs have been introduced (i.e., revenue 323 insurance in the US and insurance and mutual fund programs in the EU). Risk-reduction policies now 324 account for a significant share of producer support estimates in OECD countries. Relief from natural 325 disasters (e.g., drought) may still be needed, since systemic risks and potential for significant losses 326 make it difficult for private insurance companies to cover multiple peril risks. Although Canada and 327 developed countries continue to provide financial support for crop insurance and whole-farm income 328 insurance, some analysts believe that market solutions attenuate risks without reducing incentives to 329 diversify and crowding out private risk management strategies. Canada is unique in that a large 330 proportion of support payments are based on overall farm income, rather than on output or area 331 Wetland Reserve (WRP), and Environmental Quality Incentives Programs (EQIP). These programs aim to 338 reduce negative externalities including soil erosion and nutrient leaching into ground-and surface-339 water. The European Union, on the other hand, directs agri-environmental funding to address a wider 340 range of externalities, including public financial support for providing attractive agricultural landscapes 341 (Baylis et al. 2008) . This is consistent with the shift of European farm programs from production 342 agriculture to rural development as well as environmental or other issues of consumer importance 343 (Rude 2008) . By paying for environmental services rather than agricultural product, agri-environmentalD r a f t programs provide income to farmers, but still need to be designed carefully in order to minimize 345 production effects and related distortion to trade markets. 346
In addition to the programs that specifically target environmental goals, European farmers must meet 347 minimum environmental standards to qualify for commodity programs or other farm payments ( Program. Applicable in all provinces, this program provides funding to assist in implementing certain 373 beneficial management practices (BMPs) and requires producers to complete an Environmental Farm 374 Plan (EFP) (Robinson 2006 ) . 12 Canadian environmental standards tend to be regulated, rather than 375 encouraged through payment programs (Jongeneel 2007 ). The few experimental and pilot-scale markets 376 for ecosystem services have no relationship with BRM programs. 377
Environmental Implications of Agricultural Policy
378
Drawing on empirical comparisons across countries, Anderson (1992) argued that the liberalization of 379 developed-country agricultural policy would reduce production levels and thereby reduce global 380 environmental damage and chemical residues. Indeed, farming intensity and input use decreased in the 381 short term after New Zealand removed subsidies in 1984, but direct farmer investment in soil 382 conservation also declined as a result of new income constraints (Bradshaw and Smit 1997) . 383
Acknowledging that agricultural price support policy is linked to agricultural pollution, Just and Antle 384 (1990) presented a model framework to examine the interaction. They concluded that generalizations 385 are difficult to make due to the complex nature of yield response to inputs, environmental response to 386 production, and farm economic response to varied policy drivers. With the relationship between 387 damage and input use highly dependent on local conditions, the interactions between agriculture 388 support and environmental outcomes continue to be a challenge for both global-level models 389 12 For example see http://www.agriculture.gov.sk.ca/FSP-Environmental-Farm-Plans. D r a f t (Lewandrowski et al. 1997 ) and farm-level models (Brady et al. 2012 ). The rationale for BRM programs is 390 of course to address risk, but Pannell (2003) emphasizes the importance of uncertainty as a driver in the 391 adoption of environmental management practices. Therefore the next section explores the implications 392 of risk for on-farm decisions, and how farmers respond to risk. Following that, we present evidence from 393 the literature on both direct and indirect environmental impacts resulting from BRM programs. 394
Risk and On-farm Decisions
395
Risk is a natural part of agricultural production and adds to the cost of production. This additional cost 396 can be conceptualized as a risk premium which is a function of the producer's risk aversion, the degree 397 of risk, and the base value of production. Anything that reduces the risk premium reduces the cost of 398 production and induces production. In the absence of a full set of contingency markets to mitigate risk, 399 economic efficiency is reduced by the extra costs. Government intervention can be used as a second 400 best solution to help off-set the loss in efficiency, but these interventions can produce unintended 401 consequences. Government programs truncate the distribution of outcomes, reducing risk and affecting 402 production decisions. The biggest problem with the provision of insurance is an information problem, 403 known as moral hazard which leads to engagement in riskier behaviour, simply because the insured will 404 not fully bear the negative consequences of their actions (Hennessy 1998 The interaction between environmental practices, risk, production decisions, and government programs 425 is complex. Agricultural production and environmental emissions are both stochastic processes. With 426 respect to the environment the uncertainty can be due to randomness and unobserved or unmeasured 427 heterogeneity of the production process. Increased agricultural production is typically viewed as using 428 more inputs which can have negative environmental externalities. However, environmental effects 429 frequently exhibit thresholds, that is, concentrations of pollutants at or below which there are no 430 environmental effects due to natural degradation and/or detoxification processes. Increases in certain 431 agricultural inputs or adoption of specific practices can be either risk-enhancing or risk-reducing or 432 possibly have both effects separated by a threshold, resulting in differing environmental impacts. For 433 example, while crop diversification -which some associate with environmental benefits-is risk-434 D r a f t 21 reducing, organic rotations tend to be slightly more risky (Smith et al. 2004) . 13 Crop yield and economic 435 returns are more variable for organic agricultural systems than conventional ones, although longer 436 rotation length can reduce this variability (Cavigelli et al. 2009 However, the mechanism may not be clear-cut. In fact, typical practice suggests that fertilizer is risk-449 reducing: farmers could use fertilizer as "insurance" and thus apply nitrogen fertilizer at rates above the 450 economic optimum (Babcock 1992; Millar et al. 2010 ). To explain this contradiction, Archer et al. (2002) 451 determined that although risk -in terms of standard deviation of total returns -increased with nitrogen 452 application, average net returns were also substantially higher, potentially offsetting the increase in risk. 453
Therefore, even if risk may be higher with a certain activity, it doesn't necessarily mean that the activity 454 is less desirable. 455 13 While there are indications that organic agriculture contributes positively to agro-biodiversity and natural biodiversity, the jury is still out on the overall environmental benefits. For example, impacts on nitrate and phosphorous leaching and greenhouse gas emissions are mixed (Mondelaers, Aertsens and Van Huylenbroeck, 2009 ).
The contrasting results may also be due to the fact that risk has various components that may generate 456 different responses. Output price uncertainty may reduce input use (for a risk-averse producer), but 457 production uncertainty may make the same producer increase input use (Isik 2002) . Therefore the 458 combination of different sources of risk and stabilization policies can produce different environmental 459 impacts depending on the intensity of input use, the source of the risk, and the producer's reaction to 460 the government program. 461 
Direct Evidence of Environmental Impact
Indirect Evidence of Environmental Impact
502
Given the changes in agricultural risk management policy that have taken place since the 1990s, an 503 important question to ask is whether the remaining programs still have distortionary effects on 504 production. By modifying risk faced by farmers and increasing average income, BRM programs may alter 505 the level and mix of production and farm inputs. These effects are reflected at the extensive margin 506 (e.g., conversion of marginal or environmentally sensitive land) and at the intensive margin (i.e., 507 changing the crop and input mix on existing land). Any alterations can then indirectly influence 508 environmental outcomes. For example, wildlife habitat may be compromised when additional land is 509 brought into production. Greater intensity of chemical fertilizers and pesticides used to increase 510 production negatively affects water quality and other environmental parameters. 511
Regardless of production effects, other factors (e.g., farm size, tenancy, education level of operators, 512 and proximity to urban areas) may also affect environmental stewardship. Some of these factors are 513 important in the context of government agricultural support programs because they may garner 514 differential treatment within the agricultural policy framework. For example, tenants are less likely to 515 make capital improvements, and this effect could have either positive or negative environmental 516 implications (e.g., establishing shelterbelts or draining wetlands). Therefore, the allocation of funds to 517 landowner versus farm operator may be an important consideration in policy design. Also, farm size may 518 affect participation in government support programs and the subsequent environmental impact. (2004) also identified negative relationships between insurance subsidy level and fertilizer and chemical 540 application rates for different grain crops in the mid-western US, and by contrast -at the extensive 541 15 The problem is that these data are not as available in Canada as in other regions of the world. D r a f t 26 margin -they noted a positive correlation between crop acreage and crop insurance subsidy level. In 542 these cases, the risk-reducing nature of the subsidy seems to make it less necessary for farmers to 543 handle risk with additional purchased inputs, but also encourages cultivation of more risky marginal 544 land. These increased cultivation rates at the extensive margin may be one reason that US farm 545 households with crop insurance exhibit higher fuel consumption rates (Chang et al. 2011) . 546
Canadian studies examining BRM programs have mainly investigated crop allocation effects. Turvey 547 (2012) used a mathematical programming model to look at the production implications of whole-farm 548 income insurance for a representative farm in Manitoba, finding significant changes in land allocation to 549 different crop types. The level of subsidy associated with crop insurance played an especially significant 550 role. Similarly, using a market-level simulation model, Rude and Ker (2013) 
examined the impact of 551
AgriStability on farm inputs and crop allocation. They found that the program induced modest increases 552 in crop production with roughly 2% more wheat, coarse grains, and oilseeds. AgriStability distorted 553 input use by penalizing farmer owned inputs (non-eligible inputs under the program) in favour of 554 purchased inputs (eligible inputs under the program). This bias to purchased inputs may encourage 555 increased use of fertilizers and chemicals, resulting in negative environmental consequences. Indeed, 556 increased crop production was driven by a 7.7% increased usage of chemicals, energy, and fertilizer; 557 while land use barely increased. Neither of these studies examined the impact on the extensive margin 558 with respect to marginal land being brought into production. 559
While not directly related to BRM programs, the differential subsidization of production inputs can also 560 
Overall Production Impacts 568
Agricultural income stabilization programs truncate the probability distribution of net income facing 569 farmers, increasing the mean of the distribution, and thereby increasing the average total farm income 570 over time and creating positive incentives for production (Koundouri et al. 2009; Rude 2008) . Any farm 571 policy that positively affects agricultural production will either lead to expansion onto more land area -572 which is often marginal -or result in greater intensity of production -which tends to involve greater 573 fertilizer or pesticide use. Even so, the total production impact of current farm programs in Canada 574 appears to be relatively small. Coyle et al. (2008) demonstrate that the production effects of CAIS (a 575 predecessor to AgriStability) for Manitoba farms would be less than five percent. The mix of outputs 576 may also be affected by increasing the expected unit return and reducing risk. 577
In the past, commodity price supports and market price support of agriculture raised production levels 578 of the targeted commodities. This additional production necessitated more cultivated area. Miranda et 579 al. (1994) found that the Canadian Western Grain Stabilization Program (1975-90) increased total 580 cropped area by an average of 4.1% over the level without the program. The authors estimated that 581 58% of the effect was due to risk reduction, with the rest attributable to general increased revenue. 582 Schoney (1995) reviewed studies that investigated the production effects of risk management, and 583 found that in all cases production was either increased or not affected. He suggested that the increased 584 production that accompanies risk management may increase total profits. These excess profits are often 585 capitalized into land values, which may be beneficial for current farmers, but contribute to difficulties 586 experienced by potential farmers looking to enter the industry. This current suite of BRM programs have varying incentives for agricultural production decisions and 606 thus different spillover implications for the environment. AgriStability has relatively modest incentives 607 to induce increased production (2%) but this increase is probably driven by 8% higher use of chemicals, 608 energy, and fertilizers (Rude and Ker 2013); which can translate to negative environmental impacts. The 609 question remains if earlier commodity-specific programs had greater environmental impacts than 610 D r a f t current whole-farm programs. In general, analysts expect that commodity-specific programs increase 611 the effective producer price for individual crops inducing increased production by using more land, more 612 fertilizer, and more pesticides. GRIP (1991-95) was the last federal commodity-specific support 613
program. Empirical evidence of the production impacts of GRIP is scarce; nonetheless a peer-reviewed 614 study on an earlier program, WGSA, predicted a 4% increase in cropped area (Miranda et al. 1994) . 615
Although the WGSA pre-dated GRIP, it was more broadly based (i.e. a basket of seven crops), so it is 616 reasonable to expect a larger increase in cropped area as a result of GRIP. Rude Of the Growing Forward programs, AgriInvest and AgriRecovery are least likely to induce production and 628 have negative environmental spillovers. While AgriInvest might affect savings investment decisions it is 629 unlikely to induce production increases or change resource use. AgriRecovery is a very low-slung safety 630 net where payments cannot be anticipated, so it is also unlikely to affect production decisions or the 631 environment. 632 D r a f t
Conclusions
633
The basis for providing government support to agriculture remains vague. Average farm family income is 634 comparable to both non-farm rural and urban families so the rationale for the objective of transferring 635 income to agriculture is in doubt. Growing asset values put this objective even further in doubt. The 636 notion that agriculture faces greater risks than the rest of the economy is also debatable so this reason 637 for government intervention can also be questioned. Canadian agriculture policies are designed to 638 attempt to achieve several objectives with a single instrument (BRM), yet good policy design requires 639 one policy instrument for each objective. Given this setting, the objective of this study was to assess the 640 impact of BRM programs on the environment. 641
The natural conduit between BRM programs and the environment is through farm level production 642 decisions and input choices. The stochastic setting in which agricultural production takes place and 643 environmental impacts occur blurs the path between production decisions and observable 644 environmental impacts. These relationships may change with the intensity and level of agricultural 645 production. One conclusion from this study is that the current suite of BRM programs is unlikely to 646 induce significant additional agricultural production -which could be viewed positively in terms of 647 environmental impact. On the other hand, while the BRM transfers resources from the public to the 648 agricultural sector, these programs do not address key public environmental goals related to the 649 agricultural sector. 650 Anderson (1992) argued that improvements in agricultural risk management policy should not be held 651 captive by anticipated threats to environmental quality, as other policy instruments can effectively be 652 used to address the environmental issues. "Again, the task involves solving the problem with the 653 appropriately targeted policy instrument rather than the much blunter and less efficient instrument." 654 (Anderson 1992, p. 169) . It is therefore preferable to address the negative environmental externalities 655 D r a f t more directly. In this regard, the policy of tying current payments to cross-compliance conditions is a 656 viable option that remains unexplored in the Canadian setting. Implementing cross-compliance has its 657 challenges both in terms of requiring the program payments to be sufficiently large so as to cover 658 compliance costs while still allowing the government to monitor the agent's actions. This is an issue of 659 mechanism design and the approach is open to moral hazard (Hart and Latacz-Lohmann 2005) . 660
Alternatively, the resources could be redirected to different programs that pay farmers to provide 661 desirable environmental benefits. But this approach is also open to regulatory capture and has to be 662 closely monitored in order that the payments do not just become another venue to transfer income to 663 agriculture. These are issues that await further research. 
